Driving Forces behind Gender Equality - A Cross-Country Comparison by Wängnerud, Lena & Samanni, Marcus
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
=
=
=
=
=
Driving Forces behind Gender Equality  
– A Cross-Country Comparison 
 
 
Lena Wängnerud 
Marcus Samanni 
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
QoG WORKING PAPER SERIES 2009:28=
=
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711 
SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
 
December 2009 
 
 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 by Lena Wängnerud and Marcus Samanni. All rights reserved.  
 
Driving Forces behind Gender Equality 
- A Cross-Country Comparison 
Lena Wängnerud 
Marcus Samanni 
QoG Working Paper Series 2009:28 
December 2009 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
There is a growing body of research acknowledging the lack of good cross-country 
comparisons that contribute to the understanding of what drives change in society, i.e. 
what make some countries more gender equal than others. In this essay, five 
explanatory factors—the number of women in elected office, gender sensitive 
legislation, the level of corruption, government effectiveness, and the level of 
democracy in a country—are tested in a regression analysis. Gender equality refers to 
women’s position in their everyday life. The results show that the well-established 
notion that a high number of women in elected office is related to a high level of 
gender equality has to be revised. We suggest that a current world-wide quota trend 
has resulted in an increased divergence between the number of women in elected 
office and the status of women in society more generally. 
Keywords: Gender equality, women in parliament, economic and social rights for 
women, corruption, government effectiveness, democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has become something of an international industry to produce indexes measuring gender 
equality. The United Nations produces a Gender Development Index, as well as a Gender 
Empowerment Index; the World Economic Forum has its Gender Gap Index; Social Watch its 
Gender Equity Index; and The Alliance Save the Children produces a Mothers’ Index. So far, 
these indexes has fulfilled at least one important task; they have contributed to highlight 
prevailing inequalities between women and men, and put pressure on leaders in countries with 
less flattering results in world-wide comparisons. 
 
The question is however, if these indexes also can contribute to develop scientific research in 
the field of gender equality. There is a growing body of research acknowledging the lack of 
good cross-country comparisons that contribute to the understanding of what drives change in 
society: Why are some countries more gender equal than others? What can be done in order to 
strengthen the position of women in their everyday lives?  
 
The aim of this essay is twofold: First, and most important, we contribute to theory-
development. The point of departure is the well-established notion that a high number of 
women in elected office is related to a high level of gender equality. We introduce four 
alternative explanatory factors in a cross-country comparison: that gender sensitive legislation 
is what matters, that the level of corruption is of importance, that government effectiveness is 
of importance, and also that the general level of democracy matters. The conclusion reached 
is that previous findings have to be revised. There is a present world-wide quota-trend that 
contributes to increases in the number of women elected to parliaments in many parts of the 
world. This quota-trend might however at the same time undermine the explanatory power of 
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this perspective. What comes out as the strongest determinant of gender equality in this study 
is gender sensitive legislation. 
 
The comparison includes three ways of measuring gender equality: the Gender Gap Index 
from World Economic Forum, the Gender Equity Index from Social Watch, and the Mother’s 
Index from the International Alliance Save the Children, and the second aim of this essay is to 
evaluate the international “gender equality industry.”1 The findings are rather promising in 
this respect; the indexes produced are useful in scientific research if adjustments are made. 
Our essay ends with a call for deepened collaborations between international organizations 
producing gender equality indexes and researchers analyzing mechanisms behind change.  
 
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN ELECTED OFFICE 
There are a substantial number of studies that underpins the notion that women in elected 
office contribute to strengthen the position of women in society (Wängnerud 2009 presents an 
overview). The theoretical reasoning behind this strand of research is, for example, elaborated 
in the book The Politics of Presence, by the British political scientist Anne Phillips (1995). 
Phillips argues that women have certain interests in common and that these interests will be 
inadequately addressed in a politics dominated by men. Equal rights to a vote, the argument 
goes, are not strong enough to guarantee transformative processes; there must also be equality 
among those elected to office. 
 
The concept of women’s interests is contested. Contemporary debates concern features of 
elitism in gender research—that is, a tendency to ascribe interests to women in a top-down 
fashion—and also features of essentialism: the tendency to view women and men as fixed, 
rather than changeable, categories. Debates also concern a “first-world-bias” and how gender 
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is related to categories such as ethnicity, age and class (Dietz 2003, Klasen 2006). However, 
Phillips’s line of reasoning is an example of main-stream argumentation: 
 
Women have distinct interests in relation to child-bearing (for any foreseeable 
future, an exclusive female affair); and as society is currently constituted they also 
have particular interests arsing from their exposure to sexual harassment and 
violence, their unequal position in the division of paid and unpaid labor and their 
exclusion from most arenas of economic or political power. (Phillips 1995, pp. 
67-68). 
 
On the macro-level there is evidence that societies that elect a large number of women tend to 
be more gender-equal also in other respects than societies that elect few women (Inglehart & 
Norris 2003, Norris 1996). On the micro-level there is evidence that women in office display 
political attitudes and give priority to issues that are of special importance to women citizens 
(Diaz 2005, Dodson 2006, Lovenduski & Norris 2003, Thomas 1994). Studies following 
developments in Scandinavian countries, where the number of women in elected office has 
been high for quite a long period of time, display a shift of emphasis as the number of women 
in office increases—women’s interests are given bigger scope and become more centrally 
situated on the political agenda. Typical examples concern issues of social policy, policy on 
the family, and gender equality (Bergqvist 2000, Skjeie 1992, Wängnerud 2000a, 2000b).    
 
Recent studies do however bring some complexities to the field. In a longitudinal study of 
child-care coverage in Norwegian municipalities, covering the period 1975-1991, Bratton & 
Ray (2002) demonstrates that the number of women elected has influenced public policy 
outputs (increased child-care coverage), but the effect of women in office was most evident in 
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the period of policy innovation. In a cross-country comparative study of 31 democracies 
Schwindt-Bayler & Mishler (2005) focus on indicators of gender equality like maternity leave, 
indexes on women’s political and social equality, and marital equality in law. The main 
conclusion from their study is that increases in the number of women elected increases 
legislatures’ responsiveness to women’s policy concerns, but the authors find the effects to be 
smaller than anticipated in theory.  
 
One short-coming, of particular importance to us, is that conclusions on the role of women in 
elected office to a large extent stems from studies in established democracies. Developments 
in Scandinavian countries have for example been characterized as “incremental,” indicating 
that they have been outstretched over a long period of time. The present quota-trend, 
including many countries in Latin-America and Sub-Saharan Africa, is in contrast 
characterized as “fast-track,” indicating that changes are quick and dramatic (Dahlerup 2006).  
 
Sweden and Rwanda can be used to illustrate the case we are making: During the 1970s 
Sweden crossed the threshold of 20% women in the national parliament; the proportion 
climbed past 30% during the 1980s and 40% during the 1990s. The current figure, as of late 
2009, is 47% women in the Swedish national parliament. Whereas developments in Sweden 
spans over four decades, the number of women in the national parliament in Rwanda has 
tripled in a period of only 15 years. Gender quotas for seats in parliament were implemented 
in Rwanda as a part of the reconciliation process after the genocide in 1994. In 1994 women 
made up 17.1% of the national parliament in Rwanda. After the election 2008, the number is 
56.3%.   
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Rwanda’s situation is much different from Sweden. Sweden’s twentieth-century history is 
characterized by political stability, economic growth, and peace. Sweden is also regularly 
placed on top of international lists ranking countries according to gender equality (Anthonsen 
& Wängnerud 2008). In contrast, Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world and its 
modern history contains disastrous wars. The conclusion has been reached that the increased 
number of women elected, so far, has had little effect on policy outputs in Rwanda (Devlin & 
Elgie 2008). Thus, a high number of women elected can be related to far-reaching gender-
equality processes (Sweden), but it can also be related to a wish to start such processes 
(Rwanda). 
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATORY FACTORS  
A credible perspective in analysis of cross-country variation in gender equality is a cultural 
approach promoted by, for example, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris in their book Rising 
Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World (2003). Inglehart and Norris 
construct a gender equality scale from measurements on attitudes among citizens regarding 
women as political leaders, women’s professional and educational rights, and women’s 
traditional role as a mother. Through extensive empirical studies they demonstrate that 
egalitarian values are systematically related to the actual conditions of women’s and men’s 
lives. They conclude that modernization underpins cultural change, i.e. attitudinal change 
from traditional to gender equal values, and that these cultural changes have major impact on 
gender equality processes.  
 
In this essay we will however put some other explanatory factors to the test: that gender 
sensitive legislation is what matters, that the level of corruption is of importance, that 
government effectiveness is of importance, and also that the general level of democracy 
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matters. These factors will be tested alongside with the number of women elected to office. 
The reason to exclude the cultural approach is that values deeply embedded in society are 
hard to change; we are interested in the impact of a number of factors easier to “engineer.”   
 
The focus in the gender sensitive legislation perspective is on certain principles embedded in 
countries’ constitutions, codes, laws etcetera. There is a growing body of feminist research 
that focus on juridical aspects of gender equality in analyzes of women’s position 
(Lovenduski 2005, Weldon 2002, Williams & Thames 2008, Skjeie & Squires 2009). For 
example, Eileen McDonagh demonstrates, in the article Political Citizenship and 
Democratization: The Gender Paradox, that women’s citizenship is strengthened by 
legislation that combine “sameness” and “difference” principles. What is revealed in her study 
is the importance that states both affirm individual equality to women and women’s group 
difference in order to enhance the situation for women (McDonagh 2002, 535).   
 
The level of corruption is becoming a rather established factor in cross-country comparative 
gender research. Several findings point out that the higher the number of women in the 
national parliament of a country, the lower the level of corruption (Dollar et al 1999, Swamy 
et al 2001). The correlation as such has not been questioned, even though the causal 
mechanism behind the correlation is disputed (Goetz 2007, Sung 2003). Through our test we 
will get a first indication on whether corruption is decisive for gender equality—more widely 
defined than in terms of the number of women elected to the national parliament of a country. 
 
Government effectiveness is included on the ground that a government needs certain strength 
in order to influence everyday life situations for citizens. However, in terms of gender 
equality this factor can work in either way: an effective government, less interested in 
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strengthening the position of women, might contribute to uphold “status quo” or even worsen 
women’s position vis-à-vis men, whereas the opposite might be true for a government 
supportive of gender equality.   
 
The level of democratization is included partly to pay tribute to the kind of cultural analyzes 
that Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris have conducted. As aforementioned Inglehart & 
Norris (2003), state that modernization underpins cultural changes that lead to higher levels of 
gender equality. It is reasonable to believe that what matters for women is modernization in 
political terms. Democracy does, among other things, open possibilities for people to mobilize 
and press for changes. 
 
DEFINITION OF GENDER EQUALITY 
It goes without saying that definitions—and visions—of gender equality varies. The ambition 
that guides this research is to develop a framework useful for world-wide comparisons since 
debates on gender equality follow the same routes in many countries; questions about the 
impact of women in elected office has, as already illustrated, been asked in such different 
contexts as Rwanda and Sweden. From this ambition follows that the definition of gender 
equality has to be rather straightforward; it should capture aspects that are possible to measure 
trustworthy and meaningful in a large number of cases.   
 
Our definition focuses on individual’s room to manoeuvre in society. We want to move 
beyond the question of formal rights for women but not go as far as to prescribe certain ways 
of living as gender equal. We perceive gender equality to be about women’s possibilities for 
self-determination (c.f. Phillips 2007, 101). This way of defining gender equality is in line 
with the reasoning behind the guidelines for measuring human development developed by the 
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United Nations, which emphasize capability aspects like health, education and income 
(United Nations 2006). We study gendered aspects of capability.  
 
The core issue is to what extent societies provide opportunities for women to manoeuvre and 
thus develop their everyday lives according to their own choices. Most contemporary societies 
are constituted in ways that more severely circumscribe possibilities for self-determination 
among women than among men, and total gender equality might not even be possible. What 
interests us is however that it obviously exist considerable cross-country variation in the 
strength of women’s position. An empirical study is necessary in order to determine what 
factors that can explain such variation. 
 
DESIGN AND DATA 
It is a methodological challenge to empirically test the impact of factors like the number of 
women elected to office and gender sensitive legislation. The suggestion has been made that 
studies in the field ought to be longitudinal in design; that we, for example, should follow 
what happens “from the start” when women in elected office are few, up to the point where 
women are present in large numbers (Beckwith 2007). Longitudinal designs of this kind are 
hard to conduct and an alternative is to do cross-sectional analyses using a wide range of 
indicators and include a number of control variables in order to determine effects of a certain 
factor or perspective. 
 
Our point of departure is, as stated previously, the notion that a high number of women in 
elected office is related to a high level of gender equality. As already hinted, we assume 
gender sensitive legislation to be the strongest “competitor,” and other perspectives will 
basically serve the role as control factors; does results for the impact of women in elected 
 9
office and gender sensitive legislation hold when factors like the level of corruption, 
government effectiveness, and the general level of democracy in a country are introduced? 
We do not want to exaggerate results for the more gender specific explanatory factors. It has 
been suggested (Sung 2003, 718) that “[g]ender equality and government accountability are 
both great achievements of modern liberal democracy.”  Democracy might thus be the factor 
driving the results. 
 
The comparison includes three ways of measuring gender equality: the Gender Gap Index 
from World Economic Forum, the Gender Equity Index from Social Watch, and the Mother’s 
Index from the International Alliance Save the Children, however some adjustments have 
been made. We perceive the number of women in elected office as a factor that might cause 
variation (an independent variable) between countries and therefore it cannot be included in a 
measurement on the situation—the level of gender equality—it is supposed to explain (the 
dependent variable). In order to make the gender equality indexes useful, we have deleted 
most aspects concerning women’s political participation from the original indexes (see 
Appendix 1 for more information about the indexes).2 
 
The reason to include three indexes is to receive stability in results. The Gender Gap Index, 
the Gender Equity Index, and the Mother’s Index, all captures aspects of self-determination 
for women but they use slightly different parameters. As hinted in the title, the Mother’s 
Index put weight on women’s possibilities to (safely and voluntarily) carry out motherhood. 
The index includes information on lifetime risk of maternal mortality, percent of women 
using modern contraception and percent of births attended by trained personnel. It differs 
from the other indexes in the sense that it focus on women’s situation in absolute terms, and 
not only vis-à-vis men. The Gender Gap Index and the Gender Equity Index represents two 
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“purer” ways of measuring equality between the sexes; the focus is on gender gaps in the 
economic sector and in education. The major difference is that the Gender Gap Index also 
includes aspects of health and well-being.3 
 
The explanatory factors included are mostly well-established and tried out in previous cross-
country comparisons.4 The number of women in elected office corresponds to the percentage 
of women in single or lower house of the national parliament in a country; the Inter-
Parliamentary Union is the source for information. The level of corruption focuses on 
corruption in the public sector and the information has been gathered by Transparency 
International through surveys with business people and risk analysts. The information on 
government effectiveness comes from the World Bank and is based on several individual 
variables measuring perceptions of governance; the main focus in this specific index is on 
aspects required for a government to be able to produce and implement “good” policies, e.g. 
competent civil servants. The level of democracy is an index built on information both from 
Freedom House and Polity since Hadenius & Teorell (2005), show that an average index 
performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts. 
 
The least established factor in the following analyses is the gender sensitive legislation factor. 
We have used the Human Rights Dataset constructed by Cingranelli & Richards (2005) which 
includes information on women’s economic and social rights. In their measuring of women’s 
rights Cingranelli & Richards are interested in two things: one, the extensiveness of laws 
pertaining to women’s rights; and two, government practices towards women. The scales run 
from (0) which means that there are no rights for women under law (systematic discrimination 
based on sex may even be built into the law) and the government tolerates a high level of 
discrimination against women, to (3) which means that all or nearly all rights are guaranteed 
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by law and, in practice, the government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against 
women. We believe that this is a reasonable way of measuring the delicate balance between 
both affirming individual equality to women and women’s group difference highlighted by 
McDonagh (2002).  
 
The data is from the year 2002 or the years most close. The dataset used is the Quality of 
Government Dataset available through the Quality of Government Institute at the University 
of Gothenburg, Sweden (Teorell et. al, version 17June09). The ambition has been to include 
as many countries as possible. We put five explanatory factors to the test and it is, in technical 
terms, problematic to receive significant results if the numbers of cases are few.  
 
RESULTS 
We conducted a preliminary analysis on correlations between the number of women in the 
national parliament and the institutionalization of gender sensitive legislation in a country. 
The results show a substantial number of countries where the number of women elected to 
parliament is high but the institutionalization of gender sensitive legislation rather weak; 
African countries like South Africa, Mozambique, and Uganda, can serve as examples here. 
At the same time, we found a number of countries where the institutionalization of gender 
sensitive legislation is strong but the number of women in the national parliament low; 
examples here are European countries like France, Greece, and Italy. The two factors are 
correlated but the preliminary analysis makes clear that they do not completely overlap. 
 
Table 1 shows correlations (Pearson’s R) between each of the five explanatory factors and the 
three indexes on gender equality. The Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum) and the 
Gender Equity Index (Social Watch) are constructed in such a way that high values equal high 
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levels of gender equality. The Mother’s Index (Alliance Save the Children) is constructed the 
opposite way; low values equal a better situation for women/mothers. All of the explanatory 
factors are constructed in such a way that high values equal a “better” situation: more women 
in parliament, stronger economic and social rights for women, less corruption in the public 
sector, higher levels of government effectiveness, and higher level of democracy. This means 
that positive correlations for the Gender Gap Index and the Gender Equity Index should be 
interpreted as the factor contributing to increased gender equality, whereas the opposite is true 
for the Mother’s index—in this case should a negative correlation be interpreted as a factor 
contributing to increased gender equality.5 
 
 
Table 1.  Explanations for variation in gender equality (correlations) 
 
      Indicators on gender equality  
 
Explanatory factors 
Gender Gap  
Index (1) 
Gender Equity 
Index (2) 
Mother’s  
Index (3) 
Women in national parliament (4) 
Pearson’s R 
No. of countries included 
 
.414*** 
115 
 
.462*** 
136 
 
-.403*** 
93 
Economic and social rights for women (5) 
Pearson’s R 
No. of countries included 
 
.574*** 
128 
 
.590*** 
155 
 
-.570*** 
105 
Corruption in public sector (6) 
Pearson’s R 
No. of countries included 
 
.353*** 
128 
 
.437*** 
153 
 
-.638*** 
103 
Government Effectiveness (7) 
Pearson’s R 
No. of countries included 
 
.375*** 
128 
 
.511*** 
155 
 
-.672*** 
105 
Level of Democracy (8) 
Pearson’s R 
No. of countries included 
 
.480*** 
128 
 
.523*** 
155 
 
-.496*** 
105 
(***) p<0.01 
 
Dependent variables: 
(1) Index constructed on World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index, including indicators on economic, 
educational and health gender gaps (higher values indicate higher level of gender equality). (2) Index constructed 
on Social Watch Gender Equity Index, including indicators on education and economic activity (higher values 
indicate higher level of gender equality). (3) Original index from International Alliance Save the Children, including 
lifetime risk of maternal mortality, percent of women using modern contraception, percent of births attended by 
trained personnel, percent of pregnant women with anemia, adult female literacy rate, participation of women in 
national government, infant mortality rate, gross primary enrolment ratio, percent of population with access to safe 
water, percent of children under age 5 suffering from moderate or severe nutritional wasting (lower values indicate 
better situation for mothers). 
 
Independent variables: 
(4) Women in national parliament: percentage women in single or lower house (Inter-parliamentary union). (5) 
Economic and social rights for women: varies between 0 (no economic/social rights for women under law) and 3 
(all or nearly all of women’s economic/social rights are guaranteed by law). Index constructed on Cingranelli & 
Richards (2005). (6) Corruption in the public sector: Transparency International, ranges between 10 (highly clean) 
and 0 (highly corrupt). (7) Government effectiveness:  World Bank, normalized with a mean of 0 and a standard 
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deviation of 1 (implying that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5) (8) Democracy: average index built on 
Freedom House and Polity, scale ranges from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). 
 
This first analysis show a significant effect of all five explanatory factors on all three indexes: 
more women in parliament, stronger economic and social rights for women, less corruption in 
the public sector, more effective government, and a higher level of democracy in a country, 
means higher levels of gender equality. However, this first analysis should be interpreted with 
caution; the different factors are, as previously mentioned, correlated to each other and 
relationships reported in Table 1 might, in a tougher test, turn out to be spurious.   
 
In order to single out reliable relationships we will do regression analysis. Table 2 shows a 
bivariat regression testing the impact of each explanatory factor (taken in isolation) on the 
three indexes. The regression analysis covers countries that have information on all included 
variables, which means that the number of cases is reduced in comparison to the analysis 
presented in Table 1. The range here is between 92 (the Mother’s Index) and 136 (the Gender 
Equity Index) cases. 
 
Table 2.  Explanations for variation in gender equality (bivariat regression; coefficient, 
standard error, adjusted R² and constant included) 
 
     Indicators on gender equality  
 
Explanatory factors 
Gender Gap 
Index 
Gender Equity 
Index 
Mother’s 
Index 
Women in national parliament 
Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Adjusted R² 
Constant 
 
.002*** 
(.000) 
.164 
.813 
 
.533*** 
(.087) 
.211 
67.53 
 
-1.274*** 
(.306) 
.151 
69.39 
Economic and social rights for women 
Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Adjusted R² 
Constant 
 
.048*** 
(.005) 
.365 
.778 
 
9.886*** 
(1.083) 
.378 
61.41 
 
-29.459*** 
(3.776) 
.396 
89.57 
Corruption in public sector 
Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Adjusted R² 
Constant 
 
.009*** 
(.002) 
.147 
.806 
 
2.281*** 
(.368) 
.216 
65.41 
 
-9.049*** 
(1.151) 
.400 
88.31 
Government Effectiveness 
Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Adjusted R² 
 
.021*** 
(.004) 
.160 
 
5.509*** 
(.772) 
.269 
 
-21.542*** 
(2.287) 
.490 
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Constant .842 74.57 50.68 
Level of Democracy 
Coefficient 
Standard Error 
Adjusted R² 
Constant 
 
.007*** 
(.001) 
.175 
.792 
 
1.743*** 
(.265) 
.237 
63.13 
 
-4.945*** 
(.914) 
0.236 
82.46 
(***) p<0.01. Number of cases Gender Gap Index 115; Gender Equity Index 136; Mother’s Index 92. For more 
information see Table 1. 
 
 
The picture we get from this analyse correspond with the earlier finding: there are significant 
and easily interpretable results for all explanatory factors. We here refer to the fact that all 
results point in the same direction; higher values on the independent variables are 
significantly related to stronger positions for women in society. However, if scrutinized more 
in detail the results in Table 2 indicate some important differences between the five 
explanatory factors. Most important to note at this stage is that the factor economic and social 
rights for women consistently show high figures for the Adjusted R², which indicates that this 
factor is a powerful determinant of the outcome, i.e. the level of gender equality in a country. 
 
The next step is to put the different explanatory factors up against each other in a multivariate 
regression analysis. We use what we consider the most established explanatory factor—the 
number of women in elected office (here concretized as the percentage of women in national 
parliament) as the starting point. We then introduce the other factors one by one in a stepwise 
multivariate regression. The principle is based on our interpretation of previous research. It is 
reasonable to believe that gender sensitive legislation (here concretized as economic and 
social rights for women) is the strongest “competitor” to the assumption that women in 
elected office contribute to strengthen the position of women in society, and therefore this 
factor is introduced as number two in the regression. We also perceive the level of corruption 
as a potential “competitor” since previous research has highlighted this factor as an important 
determinant of gender related aspects of society. Government effectiveness and level of 
democracy are two factors drawn from more general discussions on “good” societies and 
 15
included in order to enable trustworthy interpretations. The multivariate analyses are 
presented in five different models for each of the three indexes (explanatory factors 
introduced one by one).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Explanations for variation in gender equality (step-wise multivariate regression; 
coefficients and adjusted R² included) 
  
Explanatory factors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Gender Gap Index  
Women in national parliament .002*** .000 .000 .000 .000 
Economic and social rights for women - .044*** .049*** .049*** .046*** 
Corruption in public sector - - -.002 -.001 .000 
Government Effectiveness - - - -.001 -.006 
Level of Democracy - - - - .002 
Adjusted R² .164 .365 .365 .359 .360 
 Gender Equity Index 
Women in national parliament .533*** .200** .200** .207** .214** 
Economic and social rights for women - 8.324*** 8.294*** 7.431*** 6.555*** 
Corruption in public sector - - 0.014 -1.373* -1.164 
Government Effectiveness - - - 3.736** 2.820 
Level of Democracy - - - - .469 
Adjusted R² .211 .395 .391 .407 .412 
 Mother’s Index 
Women in national parliament -1.274*** -.179 .069 .034 .038 
Economic and social rights for women - -27.959*** -17.594*** -14.915*** -14.558*** 
Corruption in public sector - - -5.471*** 3.603 3.293 
Government Effectiveness - - - -22.196*** -21.278*** 
Level of Democracy - - - - -.263 
Adjusted R² .151 .392 .460 .528 .523 
(*) p<0.10, (**) p<0.05, (***) p<0.01.  For more information see Table 1 and 2. 
 
 
We will start by commenting on the results for the factor women in national parliament. For 
two of the indexes, the Gender Gap Index and the Mothers Index, this factor shows a 
significant effect in the first regression (Model 1). When other factors are introduced (Model 
2—Model 5) this factor turns insignificant. However, for the Gender Equity Index the factor 
women in national parliament remain significant throughout the whole series of tests but the 
coefficient becomes notable smaller.6 We are a bit surprised over this result and have to agree 
with Schwindt-Bayler & Mishler (2005); effects are smaller than anticipated in theory. 
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What is really worth noticing is that the factor economic and social rights for women show 
significant results—consistently at the 0.01 level—in all tests for all three indexes. This is a 
convincing result, no other factor display such a robust pattern. Coefficients are also large 
which underlines the importance of this factor. There is little doubt that what we have at hand 
is a reliable and trustworthy finding: gender sensitive legislation is an important determinant 
for the level of gender equality in a country. Few of the other factors show any consistent 
pattern in the multivariate regressions, even though it is reasonable to believe that government 
effectiveness is decisive for the situation for women/mothers. Government effectiveness show 
significant results for the Mothers Index and values are high, which means that this might 
even be the most important factor when gender equality is defined in a way that relates to 
women’s possibilities to carry out motherhood.7 
 
TAKING REGIONAL ASPECTS INTO ACCOUNT 
There are many trade-offs in comparative studies including a large number of countries. What 
can possibly be gained by comparing established democracies like France, Greece, and 
Italy—mentioned in an earlier section—with struggling countries like South-Africa, Uganda, 
and Mozambique? In order to enrich our study we have conducted two sets of analysis taking 
regional aspects into account. In the first set of analysis we repeated the regressions reported 
in Table 1 (results not shown in table) in a sub-set of (i) OECD countries versus (ii) non-
OECD countries. In the second set of analysis (results not shown in table) the same 
regressions were repeated in (iii) countries in Latin-America and Sub-Saharan Africa versus 
(iv) countries in the rest of the world.  
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The overall impression from the analyses taking regional aspects into account is that the main 
findings of our study remain robust: the factor women in national parliament show few 
significant results whereas the opposite is true for the factor economic and social rights for 
women. It should be noted however that with five explanatory factors and few cases—as in 
the sub-sets described above—it is hard to reach any significant results at all. 
 
JURISDICTION AS A ROUTE TO INCREASED GENDER EQUALITY 
Our results do not rule out that the number of women elected to office is important for the 
level of gender equality in a country. The design we have applied is not ideal for capturing 
effects of such transformations; developments need to be followed more closely over a long 
period of time. Studies of the effect of women in elected office should preferably also take the 
suggestion from Bratton & Ray (2005) into account; effects might be strongest in periods of 
policy innovation and therefore country-specific characteristics needs to be built into the 
theoretical model. 
 
We do however believe that our case is strong: “fast-track” quotas resulting in quick and 
dramatic changes in the number of women elected have, on the over-arching level, meant an 
increased divergence between changes in the number of women elected and changes in the 
status of women in society more generally. This situation is rather new and the consequences 
have to be scrutinized further. The strongest argument for parity, from a normative point of 
view, does not concern certain policies or transformation of society in “women-friendly” 
directions but democracy and justice per se. Many hopes for change are nonetheless 
connected to the implementation of quotas and other measures to increase the number of 
women elected, and there certainly is a risk that a world-wide quota trend turns into a world-
wide backlash if hopes are not met. 
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We do not suggest that gender sensitive legislation should substitute increases in the number 
of women elected as a route towards a strengthened position for women in their everyday 
lives. There is a growing body of feminist research that focus on juridical aspects of gender 
equality in analyzes of women’s position and our findings provides further evidence for the 
credibility of  this perspective. However, an alternative interpretation of the result that women 
in parliament did not have a significant effect on gender equality when economic and social 
rights for women was included, is that the latter could be a mechanism through which the 
former works. That is, more women in parliament mean more economic and social rights for 
women, which lead to better gender equality. This would mean that women in parliament 
does not lack an effect on gender equality, only that it is further back in the “causal chain.” 
 
It would be a mistake if gender researcher, or policy-maker wanting to speed up gender 
equality processes, started to “side-step” parliaments and electoral democracy. In order to 
pinpoint the mechanisms that drive change in society we need comprehensive approaches that 
can capture interplay between the political and juridical domains of society. At the same time 
we have to admit that the findings in this essay are fascinating and the micro-foundations for 
the gender sensitive legislation perspective really deserves to be developed: How does gender 
sensitive legislation make an impact on the position of women? What parts are important? A 
further aspect to develop is how robust results are when within-country variation is taken into 
account; are results stable across dimensions like ethnicity, age, and class? 
 
The last theme we want to touch upon is collaboration between international organizations 
producing indexes over gender equality and gender oriented researchers. We believe that 
much could be gained if international organizations started to gather and pile information 
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from the perspective of causal relationships. We had to devote quite a lot of energy to “clean” 
indexes in order to make them useful and still we could not reach a perfect solution. The 
indexes produced by World Economic Forum, Social Watch and the International Alliance 
Save the Children do already fulfil important tasks, but instead of  being focused on 
“blaming” or “hailing” countries through different rankings they could be focused on 
developing the understanding of why some countries are more gender equal than others. In the 
best of worlds, it is possible to do both. 
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APPENDIX 
I. Dependent variables 
 
Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum) 
(2007 or most recent year available) 
 
The variable varies theoretically between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate a more gender 
equal society. 
 
The index is a mean of three underlying variables from the World Economic Forum: economic 
gender gap, educational gender gap and health gender gap. The economic gender gap is based 
on the ratio of female over male labor force participation, the female over male wage ratio (for 
similar work), the female over male ratio of legislators senior officials and managers and the 
female over male ratio of professional and technical workers. The educational gender gap is 
based on the female over male literacy rate, the female over male net primary education 
enrollment, the female over male net secondary education enrollment and the female over male 
gross tertiary education enrollment. The health gender gap is based on the female over male 
healthy life expectancy and the female over male sex ratio at birth. 
 
Gender Equity Index (Social Watch) 
(2008 or most recent year available) 
 
The variable varies theoretically between 0 and 100, where higher values indicate a more 
gender equal society. 
 
The index is a mean of two variables: education gap and economic activity gap. The 
education gap is estimated on the gender gap in the following indicators: literacy rate, primary 
school enrolment, secondary school enrolment and tertiary education enrolment. The 
economic activity gap is based on gender gaps in economic activity rate and estimated earned 
income. 
 
Mothers’ Index (International Alliance Save the Children) 
(2002) 
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The variable is a ranking of 105 countries, which means that lower values indicate a better 
situation for mothers. 
 
The index is an original index produced by the International Alliance Save the Children and is 
based on the following indicators: 
 
• Lifetime risk of maternal mortality 
• Percent of women using modern contraception 
• Percent of births attended by trained personnel 
• Percent of pregnant women with anemia 
• Adult female literacy rate 
• Participation of women in national government 
• Infant mortality rate 
• Gross primary enrollment ratio 
• Percent of population with access to safe water 
• Percent of children under age 5 suffering from 
moderate or severe nutritional wasting 
 
II. Independent variables 
 
Women in National Parliament (International Parliamentary Union) 
(2002) 
 
Percentage women in single house or lower house.   
 
Economic and Social Rights for Women (Cingranelli & Richards) 
(2002) 
 
The index varies between 0 and 3, where higher values indicate more economic and social 
rights for women. 
 
We have constructed this index as a mean of two variables from the Cingranelli & Richards 
Human Rights Dataset: women’s economic rights and women’s social rights.  
Practices. Cingranelli & Richards base their coding of variables primarily on US State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights. 
 
The coding of the two variables underlying the index is described as follows in the coding 
guide from Cingranelli & Richards. 
 
Women’s economic rights: “In measuring women’s economic rights we are primarily interested 
in two things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women’s economic rights; and two, 
government practices towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws. 
 
Regarding the economic equality of women: 
(0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based 
on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination 
against women. 
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(1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the 
government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. 
The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women. 
(2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government 
DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level 
of discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women’s economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the 
government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or 
almost no discrimination against women.” 
 
Women’s social rights: “In measuring women’s social rights we are primarily interested in two 
things: one, the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women’s social rights; and two, government 
practices towards women or how effectively the government enforces the law. 
 
Regarding the social equality of women: 
(0) There are no social rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on 
sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination 
against women. 
(1) There are some social rights for women under law. However, in practice, the 
government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. 
The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women. 
(2) There are some social rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES 
enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level of 
discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women’s social rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the 
government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or 
almost no discrimination against women.” 
 
Corruption in Public Sector (Transparency International) 
(2000-2007) 
  
The variable varies between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean) 
 
The index from Transparency International focuses on corruption in the public sector and 
defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling 
the index tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with 
a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do 
not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The index relates to perceptions 
of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public. 
 
Government Effectiveness (World Bank) 
(2002) 
 
The variable is constructed to bee normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1 each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between 
-2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. 
 
The World Bank indicator on government effectiveness is based on many underlying variables 
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from several separate data sources constructed by 
different organizations. 
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The index combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
policies. The main focus of the index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to 
produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. 
 
Level of Democracy (Freedom House/Polity) 
(2000-2005) 
 
Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. 
 
Average of Freedom House political rights and civil rights score is transformed to a scale 0-10 
and the revised version of combined Polity score is transformed to a scale 0-10. These 
variables are averaged into level of democracy score. This is the imputed version, with 
imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the 
average Freedom House measure. Hadenius & Teorell (2005) show that this average index 
performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts 
NOTES 
                                                 
1 These organizations have been chosen since they have a good international reputation and 
their indexes are often referred to. Social Watch describes itself as an “international NGO 
watchdog network monitoring poverty eradication and gender equality” 
(www.socialwatch.org). ”The World Economic Forum is an independent international 
organization committed to improving the state of the world by engaging leaders in 
partnerships to shape global, regional and industry agendas” (www.weforum.org). 
International Alliance Save the Children ‘’is the world’s largest independent organization for 
children, making a difference to children’s lives in over 120 countries” 
(www.savethechildren.net). 
2 The exception here is the Mother’s Index form the International Alliance Save the Children. 
It turned out to be very complicated to delete values on participation of women in national 
government but since the Mother’s Index consists of several parameters we perceive this as 
less problematic.  
3 We made a reference to the United Nations for our theoretical definition, however we do not 
include the UN Gender-related Development Index (GDI) or the UN Gender Empowerment 
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Measure (GEM) in our empirical analyses. The UN states that the GDI index only is 
meaningful in relation to the HDI index (the GDI imposes a “penalty” on each country score 
on the HDI index according to the size of the gender gaps in the three development 
components health, education and incomes) and warns against rankings based on this index 
solely. The GEM index is seen as better suited for “pure” gender equality rankings, but the 
problem from our perspective is that the index, as reflected in the title, focuses on 
empowerment and great importance is attached to women’s shares of parliamentary seats. 
4 We started off with a comprehensive test using more than one indicator on each explanatory 
theme: women in national parliament and female state leaders on ”women in elected office”; 
economic/social rights for women and labor rights for women on ”gender sensitive 
legislation”; corruption in public sector and quality of government more widely on ”clean 
society” (later renamed to corruption in public sector); government effectiveness and rule of 
law on “effective society” (later renamed government effectiveness): We also used indicators 
like freedom of the press, attitudes towards gender equality, and GDP per capita in this first 
test. Three criteria were used in the decision on which factors to keep: correlations (Pearson’s 
R) should be significant at the 0.01 level for all three gender equality indexes; numbers of 
countries covered should be comparatively high; and, patterns displayed should be 
interpretable (which include a theoretical judgement).  
5 In strict terms this table (Table 1) is not necessary. However, we wanted to show that the 
factors selected passed a “first test” which convinced us that they were all equally important 
to include in the regressions. 
6 The regressions for the Gender Equity Index were also done in a smaller sample including 
only those countries with values also on the Gender Gap Index and the Mother’s  Index (a 
subset of 77 countries). The factor women in parliament remained significant (at the 0.10 
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level) so “sample selection” is not the explanation for the deviant result. We want to stress the 
value of using several different indexes in order to reach stability in results. 
7 We want to comment on the result that corruption does not turn out to be significant: We 
believe that further studies should be conducted using multiple ways of measuring corruption, 
however our study gives some support to the strand of research arguing that relationships 
between corruption and gender equality is spurious. 
